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Abstract
Delegation is a mechanism that allows one agent to act on another’s privilege. It is
important that the privileges should be delegated to a person who is trustworthy. In
this paper, we propose a multi-level delegation model with trust management in access
control systems. We organize the delegation tasks into three levels, Low, Medium, and
High, according to the sensitivity of the information contained in the delegation tasks.
It motivates us that the more sensitive the delegated task is, the more trustworthy the
delegatee should be. In order to assess how trustworthy a delegatee is, we devise trust
evaluation techniques to describe a delegatee’s trust history and also predict the future
trend of trust. In our proposed delegation model, a delegatee with a higher trust level
could be assigned with a higher level delegation task. Extensive experiments show that
our proposed multi-level delegation model is eﬀective in accurately predicting trust and
avoiding sensitive information disclosure.
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1 Introduction
In a multi-agent system, delegation is the primary mechanism of inter-agent collaboration
and cooperation [8, 9, 12, 16]. The basic idea behind the delegation is that some active entity
in a system delegates authority to another active entity to carry out some functions on behalf
of the former. For example, when an agent is unable to perform a task due to sickness, s/he
may delegate the privileges to another agent so that the latter agent can use the privileges
to complete the task on time. It is through the delegation that the agent is able to function
eﬀectively. Normally, a delegator in a delegation is an agent that delegates a certain task to
another agent or a group of agents. The delegator has the permission to perform a certain
action and also the ability to further delegate this right. A delegatee is the one who has been
delegated to execute a delegated task.
Role-based delegation based on role-based access control (RBAC) has been proven to
be a ﬂexible and useful access control for information sharing in distributed collaborative
environment [3, 28, 15]. In contrast to normal access right administration operations, which
are performed centrally, delegation operations are usually performed in a distributed manner.
Security of delegation becomes one big issue that has received attention during the past few
years in distributed systems. In this paper, we are interested in the delegation of tasks (task-
delegation) as compared with the delegation of rights only (right-delegation) described in [1].
Both task-delegation and rights-delegation involve the release of rights from one principal to
another. However, in the case of task-delegation we consider the situation in which entity
issues an imperative command to another entity to perform the delegated task within the
broad area of security.
Our line of reasoning is motivated by the real-world situations in which one entity delegates
some rights to a second entity with the explicit command to complete a given task validly
and securely. Loosely deﬁned, a task consists of a number of computational operations to
be performed based on some data which may be sensitive and insecure to be misused or
disclosed to public. Here, we organize delegated tasks into three diﬀerent levels according
to their sensitivity as shown in Table 1. For the simplicity of discussion, in this paper we
consider three-level partitions of delegated tasks, which are Low, Medium, and High. The
classiﬁcation standard is ﬂexible, which can be determined by a delegator with his or her
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Task level Information Properties
The information is not sensitive and can
Low Public
be delegated to anyone.
Not public The information is partially sensitive and should
Medium
partially sensitive be delegated to reliable delegatees.
Not public The information is totally sensitive and should
High
totally sensitive be delegated to someone with higher reliability.
Table 1: The classiﬁcation of delegation tasks
subjective preference. A Low task level indicates the delegation task does not include sensitive
information or resources that can cause a breach. The information in a Low level of the
delegation task is the public information that can be delegated to anyone for information
sharing. The tasks in the Medium level contain the information that is partially public and
partially sensitive. When referring to the delegation, there should be a higher requirement
on the reliability of the delegatee, since the more reliable the delegatee is, the less chance
the sensitive information would be misused, and the more likely the delegation task could be
accomplished successfully. The High task level indicates the delegation task is very important
and contains highly sensitive information and requires that the delegatee should be totally
trustworthy.
Essentially, a delegation operation could temporarily change the access control state so
as to allow an agent to use another agent’s access privileges. Due to its eﬀect on the access
control state, delegation may lead to violation of security policies. More precisely, information
breaching may happen even during the delegation phase. Any information, the loss, misuse,
or unauthorized access to or modiﬁcation of which could adversely aﬀect the privacy to which
individuals are entitled. Thus, risk during the delegation must not be overlooked, and more
sophisticated methods are needed to create a secure delegation system. More speciﬁcally,
delegation policies may depend on private aspects concerning both the delegatee’s reliability
and the sensitivity of the delegated tasks.
3
1.1 Motivation
In an open environment, the entities are customarily alien to each other. When entering into
a delegation, the delegator is entering into an uncertain interaction in which there is a risk of
failure due to the delegation decisions. In other words, a given delegatee may not be reliable
for the delegated task, especially, when sensitive information is included in the delegation
tasks, the delegator’s privacy may be breached because of the unreliability of the delegatee.
For example, if the task being delegated is a goal comprising of multiple tasks and requiring
access to multiple resources and sensitive information, the delegation in this case should
be very cautious, since the failure of the delegation has a considerable inﬂuence on privacy
disclosure. Therefore, when delegating a task, the choice of the cooperative partner plays an
important role in determining whether the task would be fulﬁlled successful or not. In order
to operate eﬀectively, delegators need some mechanisms for ﬁnding reliable partners, and this
requirement could be satisﬁed with the help of trust. Trust is well recognized as a means of
assessing the risk of cooperating with others [6, 10, 14, 25]. There are two main categories of
trust: experience-based and recommendation-based [18, 26]. In the former category, agents
assess the trust solely based on their own experience; in the latter, trust is evaluated based
on information provided by others (typically in addition to individual experience). Within
this trust evaluation mechanism, a ﬁnal trust value is computed to reﬂect the general trust
status of every service provider. However, such a single trust value cannot reﬂect the real trust
status very well. For example, assume the trust values are in the range of [0,1]. A person with
a higher trust value 0.9 may behave worse in future than the one with the trust value 0.6.
This simple example demonstrates that the single-value trust evaluation approach can not
reﬂect the changes of the trust any more. Trust trend evaluation becomes important in order
to indicate whether the trust will become better or worse in the forthcoming cooperation.
Therefore, new eﬀective trust evaluation approaches are required to provide more precise
trust information that could indicate to what extent and during which period a delegatee is
reliable and trustworthy.
Even though delegation is well recognized as a very useful component of access control
systems [3, 5, 28], to our best knowledge, no current work has performed in-depth study
on how to manage a delegation in a secure manner. Typically, we are facing the following
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challenges in developing a secure multi-level delegation model by taking trust into account:
Challenge One: Since the sharing of the sensitive information must only be restricted to
trustworthy parties, how to develop eﬀective trust evaluation approaches to provide more
precise trust information?
Challenge Two: Facing with the fact that the delegation tasks in diﬀerent levels require
diﬀerent reliability of delegatees, how to build the projection between the reliability of the
delegatee’s and the sensitivity of the delegated tasks, and further construct a secure multi-level
delegation model?
1.2 Contributions
Confronting with these challenges, we provide the following solutions.
• Decomposing delegation tasks into three diﬀerent levels according to the sensitivity of each
delegation task. Each level has diﬀerent requirement of reliability of cooperation partners.
• Proposing a new eﬀective trust evaluation technique which considers both trust values and
trust trend. The trust value provides an indication for the ﬁnal trust level while, the trust
trend value is used to predict the future trend of trust.
• Building a projection between the reliability of the delegatee and the sensitivity of delegated
tasks, which leads to a secure multi-level delegation model.
• Investigating the eﬀectiveness of our proposed multi-level delegation model and the ex-
perimental studies conﬁrm the advantages of our model in terms of accurate prediction and
sensitive information protection.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the new trust evaluation
approach is proposed by combining trust values and trust trend together to predict a dele-
gatee’s trustworthiness. In Section 3, we propose a multi-level delegation model with trust
management and discuss several diﬀerent delegation types. We show our experimental results
in Section 4 and provide a brief survey of related work in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 6.
5
2 The trust evaluation
The notion of trust is well recognized as a means of assessing the risk of cooperating with
others [6, 25, 20]. In a delegation, it is important to tell delegators to what extent a delegatee
is trustworthy for the delegated task. Corresponding to the diﬀerent levels of delegated tasks,
in this section we organize the trust into three trust levels, in which delegators could evaluate
the trustworthiness of delegatees.
Trust represents an agent’s estimate of how likely another is to fulﬁl its commitments.
Trust inﬂuences the delegators attitudes and actions, but can also have eﬀects on the delegatee
and other elements in the environment. As discussed before, a trust value can be calculated to
provide more precise indication of the trust history to a delegator. However, it is not enough
to indicate the real trust status of a delegatee very well, i.e., the single-value approach cannot
reﬂect changes of the trust trend. In this paper, we adopt two interpretations of trust. One
is to view trust as the perceived reliable history of somebody, called “reliability trust”, while
the other is to view trust as a trend of trust changes in a given period, called “future trust”.
Deﬁnition 1 (Reliability trust). Reliability trust is the trust status of individuals depen-
dent on his/her history behavior.
As the name suggested, reliability trust can be interpreted as the subjective probability of
someone by performing a given action on which its success lies. In our previous work [13], we
evaluate the reliability trust in three steps: (1) Calculate the trust value based on histories; (2)
Calculate the trust value from recommendations; (3) Combine the observed trust values from
histories and recommendations. With this approach, we can obtain a delegatee’s reliability
trust value. However, trust can be more complex. Future trust aims to capture the changes of
trust trend in the forthcoming future. Namely, given a set of delegatees with the same trust
value, the one which is becoming better is more desirable to delegators and more reliable to
fulﬁll the delegated work well.
Deﬁnition 2 (Future trust). Future trust is a general trend of trust changes which could
be useful to predict the future trust level of service quality.
In order to evaluate the future trust, we refer to the idea of exponential regression [22]. In
this paper, we introduce a weighted exponential regression method to evaluate the trust trend
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Figure 1: Weighted least-squares exponential regression
(shown as Figure 1). This method is used to obtain the best exponential ﬁt from a set of
given data points. This best exponential ﬁt is characterized by the sum of weighted squared
residuals with its least value, where a residual is the diﬀerence between a data point and the
regression curve. Once obtaining the exponential regression, the gradient at each data point
can be taken as our future trust value. Now we introduce the trust trend evaluation method.
Let (t1, q1), (t2, q2), . . . , (tn, qn) denote the given data points in a certain period, where
qi(qi ∈ [0, 1]) is the service quality value at time ti(ti < ti+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then the exponential
regression can be represented as
q = a0e
a1t + a2 (1)
where a0, a1 and a2 are constants to be determined, specially, the product of a0 and a1
indicates the trust trend value. As the distance from point (ti, qi) to the regression curve is
di = |qi − (a0ea1ti + a2)| (2)
Based on the method of weighted least squares, we let w(i) be the weight function for the
service quality qi at the i
th service (i = 1 · · ·n). The choice of w(i) could be ﬂexible. Any
monotonic increasing function could be a candidate of w(i). For simplicity, in this paper, we
adopt w(i) = iβ , (1 ≤ i ≤ n, β ≥ 1) as our weight function. Thus, the sum of squares of the
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distance can be calculated as follows:
S =
n∑
i=1
w(i)2d2i =
n∑
i=1
w(i)2(qi − (a0ea1ti + a2))2 (3)
Now our task is to minimize the sum of the distance S with respect to the parameters a0,
a1 and a2, with the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.
Since function S is continuous and diﬀerentiable, based on Lagrange Multiplier method
[19], the minimization point of S makes the ﬁrst derivative of function S be zero. Thus, we
diﬀerentiate S with respect to a0, a1 and a2, and set the results to zero, which gives
∂S
∂a1
= −2
n∑
i=1
w(i)2(qi − (a0ea1ti + a2))(a0tiea1ti) = 0 (4)
∂S
∂a2
= −2
n∑
i=1
w(i)2(qi − (a0ea1ti + a2)) = 0 (5)
and
∂S
∂a0
= −2
n∑
i=1
w(i)2(qi − (a0ea1ti + a2))ea1ti = 0 (6)
Equations (4), (5) and (6) can be solved for the unknown a0, a1 and a2. Thus, based on
the method of weighted least squares exponential regression, we can obtain the trust trend
value a0a1(a0, a1 ∈ R). The trust trend value shows a general trend of changes of trust in the
near future, which is important when we choose a delegatee with serious caution. If a0a1 > 0,
it indicates that the future trust is up-going, whereas, a0a1 < 0 indicates that the future trust
is dropping; and a0a1 = 0 indicates the future trust remains unchanged.
Both reliability trust and future trust reﬂect diﬀerent trust status about the individuals
on whom the delegator depend for the delegation task. Reliability trust is most naturally
measured as a degree of reliability, which is expressed as a continuous function mapped into
[0,1], whereas future trust indicates the trend of trust changes, which ranges from −∞ to +∞.
To work eﬃciently, we combine reliability trust and future trust into diﬀerent rust levels to
8
illustrate the trustworthiness of a delegatee. To be consistent with delegated task levels, three
trust levels are organized through the following projection:
Deﬁnition 3 (Trust level). Let T be the set of reliability trust values and TT be the set
of future trust values. The F function projects reliability trust and future trust into three
diﬀerent trust levels.
F : T × TT → {L,M,H}
where L,M,H refers to Low, Medium and High trust levels.
High trust level denotes the person at this level is highly trusted, which means not only
his ﬁnal trust value is high but also the trust trend is up-going. Low level denotes the person
is less trusted, where his ﬁnal trust value is low, also the trust trend is dropping. Medium
level is the intermediate state. So the trust level assignments can be further explained as
follows:
∀t ∈ T, a0a1 ∈ TT
• F (t, a0a1) = L, if t ∈ (0, 0.5) and a0a1 ∈ (−∞, 0)
• F (t, a0a1) = M , if t ∈ [0.5, 1) and a0a1 ∈ (−∞, 0]; or t ∈ (0, 0.5] and a0a1 ∈ [0,+∞)
• F (t, a0a1) = H , if t ∈ (0.5, 1) and a0a1 ∈ (0,+∞)
Until now, each delegatee is companied with a trust level, which could indicate to what
extent the delegatee is reliable. So far, the problem left is to build the delegation model based
on the evaluation of trust. Our idea is that the delegatee who is trusted at a greater degree
would have a higher probability to complete the delegated task than a delegatee with a lower
trust level. The formalized delegation model is described in the next section.
3 The multi-level delegation model
Delegation has received signiﬁcant attention from the research community in recent years.
A number of delegation models have been proposed [5, 9, 21, 12] and most of them are for
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). A few of research works related to introducing subjective
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trust into delegation model have been reported [7, 24]. In this section, we build a multi-level
delegation model with trust management.
3.1 The delegation model
Delegation is a mechanism that allows an agent A to act on another agent B’s behalf by
making B’s access rights available to A. Suppose a task is delegated from one to another,
the latter actually gets the access right to work on this task. It needs to be organized as an
important mechanism to provide resiliency and ﬂexibility in access control systems.
Delegatee 1
Delegatee 2
Delegatee (n-1)
Delegatee n
High
Medium
Low
High level
delegation tasks
delegation tasks
delegation tasks
Medium level
Low level
Set of Delegatees
Trust Levels
Delegation Task Levels
Figure 2: Distribution of delegations based on trust levels
Since delegation tasks are divided into three diﬀerent levels, it is important to address
how to distribute these tasks to delegatees based on their trust levels? The idea is that a
delegatee in the high trust level can be assigned with the delegation task of all levels, which
are Low, Medium, and High. The delegatee in the medium trust level can be assigned with
Low and Medium level tasks, while the delegatee in the low trust level can only be assigned
with Low level tasks. In this case, all delegated tasks are assigned in a hierarchal style, since
the delegatee in a higher trust level is more trustworthy and is more likely to ﬁnish a higher
level delegation task than the one in a lower trust level. The distribution of delegation is
shown in Figure 2. In order to describe the delegation in a precise manner, we focus on a
speciﬁc model about how delegatees gain the access right.
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Deﬁnition 4. Let Dr, De, Dt be the set of delegators, delegatees, and delegated tasks respec-
tively. Level = {L,M,H} is the set of trust levels (or delegated task levels). A delegation
relationship is deﬁned as DR ⊆ Dr × DeL × DtL × {g, t}, where DeL ⊆ De × Level is the
membership between delegatees and trust levels, DtL ⊆ Dt×Level is the membership between
delegated tasks and task levels, and g, t refers to grant or transfer operation.
The delegatee-trust level membership DeL denotes that each delegatee is assigned with
diﬀerent trust levels and DtL denotes that each delegated task is assigned with diﬀerent task
levels. For example, the delegation relationship (dr, (de, L), (dt,M), g) ∈ DR indicates that
delegator dr has delegated the L level task dt to delegatee de in the M trust level via a grant
operation, while (dr, (de, L), (dt,M), t) indicates that delegator dr has delegated L level task
dt to delegatee de in M trust level via a transfer operation. The diﬀerence between grant
and transfer is shown as follows. A delegation operation is essentially an access control state
transition operation, which takes one of the following three forms:
• grant(dr, (de, l), (dt, l)): delegator dr grants the access of l level delegation task to delegatee
de who is in l trust level. After the delegation operation, de gains the access right to dt and
dr still keeps dt, where l ∈ {L,M,H}.
• trans(dr, (de, l), (dt, l)): delegator dr transfers the access of l level delegation task to
delegatee de who is in l trust level. After the delegation operation, de gains the access right
to dt and dr temporarily loses dt, where l ∈ {L,M,H}.
• revoke(dr, (de, l), (dt, l)): delegator dr revokes the delegated task dt from delegatee de.
Note that a delegator can grant or transfer diﬀerent level tasks to delegatees, and only
the corresponding delegator can revoke the delegated task from the delegatee. For example,
grant(Alice, (Bob,H), (read all emails, M), g) means Alice delegated the Medium level task
“read all emails” to Bob with High trust level via a grant operation, while after the dele-
gation Bob gains the access right to all emails and Alice still keeps the access right on all
emails. However, transfer(Alice, (Bob,H), (read all emails, M), t) means Alice delegated
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the Medium level task “read all emails” to Bob with High trust level via a transfer opera-
tion, and after the delegation Alice temporarily loses the access right to all emails. Deﬁnitely,
only Alice could revoke the delegated task “read all emails” from Bob.
Since delegation is performed in a distributed manner, in the sense that everyone may
perform delegation operations, it is undesirable to allow a delegator to delegate the tasks
in a completely unrestricted way. Delegation operations are thus subject to the control of
authorization rules, which takes one of the following three forms:
• can grant(cond, (dt, l)): a delegator who satisﬁes condition cond can grant the l level task
dt to other delegatees, where l ∈ {L,M,H}, cond is an expression formed through using
the binary operators ∨ and ∧, the unary operator ¬, and parentheses.
• ca transfer(cond, (dt, l)): a delegator who satisﬁes condition cond can transfer the l level
task dt to other delegatees, where l ∈ {L,M,H}.
• can receive(cond, (dt, l)): a delegatee who satisﬁes condition cond can receive the l level
task dt from other delegators, where l ∈ {L,M,H}.
For example, the rule can receive(Clerk ∧ M, (“read the documents”, M)) states that
anyone who is at the Medium trust level and a member of Clerk can receive the Medium
level task “read the document”.
3.2 Types of delegations
Delegation models could be complicated. To create a delegation model, one needs to decide on
a number of features, such as whether the delegation is dated and valid only for a certain period
of time, whether delegatees can further delegate the tasks to others and so on. Retention
period refers to during which time the delegation is valid. We denote TI as the set of time
intervals. Diﬀerent types of delegations contended in our delegation model are discussed as
follows.
• Time Bound Delegation TBD ⊆ TI ×Dr ×DeL×DtL: It is a delegation that is valid
only for a certain time period, where T is the set of time intervals.
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For example, delegation ([12/06/2008, 10/08/2008], Alice, (Bob, H), (read all emails, M))
denotes that this delegation is only valid between 12/06/2008 and 10/08/2008 and only
during this period, Bob has the access right to all emails.
• Group Delegation GD ⊆ Dr ×DeL×DtL: It can be used to delegate access rights to a
group of delegatees who satisfy certain conditions.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M))denotes that Alice
delegates the Medium level task “read all emails” to a group of employees who are in
Medium trust level.
• Action Restricted Delegation ARD ⊆ Dr×DeL×DtL×CD: This forces the delegatee
to satisfy certain conditions before the delegated task can be carried out, where CD is the
set of conditions.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M), (age(24), name(Bob)))
states that only employees who is in Medium trust level, aged 24 and named Bob can gain
the access right to “read all emails”.
• Re-delegable Delegation RD ⊆ Dr ×DeL ×DtL × {Ture, False}: In this delegation,
Ture means the delegated task could be re-delegated to others, while False means not.
For example, delegation(Alice, (Employee, M), (read all emails, M), true) denotes that the
delegatee is allowed to further delegate the task.
Delegation policy: Delegation policies describe rules for delegation of the rights. A rule
for delegation would be checking that an agent has the ability to delegate before allowing the
delegation to be approved. A policy can be viewed as a set of rules for a particular domain
that deﬁnes what permissions a user has and what permissions she/he can obtain. A policy
also contains basic or axiomatic rights that all individuals possess.
4 Experimental evaluations
The main goals of the experiments are two-fold. First, we study the precision of our trust
model in predicting the trend of the trust. Second, we investigate the eﬀectiveness of our
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proposed multi-level trust-based delegation model in terms of disclosure rate.
No. of data set Probability distribution function
1 exponential distribution (Exprnd)
2 geometric distribution (Geornd)
3 Poisson distribution (Poissrnd)
4 Uniform distribution (Unifrnd)
5 Normal distribution (Normrnd)
Table 2: Distributions of the data sets
Trust value and its trend evaluation: In this set of experiments, we compared the
precision of both the trust value and trust trend prediction with the existing method proposed
in [11]. We denote E-regression as the exponential regression model proposed in this paper
and L-regression as the regression model of [11]. In order to evaluate the precision of two
approaches, we generate ﬁve data sets with ﬁve diﬀerent probability distribution functions
as our test data, and each data set contains 5000 records, and each record is in the form of
(x, y), where 1 ≤ x ≤ 5000 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Table 2 shows the probability distributions of each
data set. Diﬀerent metrics are adopted in evaluating the precision of the trust value and trust
trend. For evaluating the precision of trust value, each data set is ﬁrst divided into training
and testing sets, and both regression models are trained by the training sets and tested by
testing sets. If the predicted trust value is tpre and the actual trust value is tact, then the
precision is calculated as 1− |tpre−tact|
tact
. The higher the value is, the more precise the predicted
trust value is. To evaluate the precision of the trust trend, we use the metric named vector
angle, which is to compute the angle between two vectors(trends). The vector angle is deﬁned
to be the angle φ between 0 and 180 degrees that satisﬁes the relationship: cosφ = t1·t2|t1||t2| ,
where | · | refers to the vector length and the numerator denotes the inner product of the
trends t1 and t2. The more close the cosine value is to 1, the more similar two trends are. To
reduce the randomness, we run the evaluation for 1000 times for each data set to obtain the
average.
The evaluation results are shown in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) displays the precision of the trust
value of both regression models under ﬁve diﬀerent distributed data sets. We can easily see
that the average precision of our proposed exponential regression model is around 70%, which
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: (a) The precision of the trust value; (b) The precision of the trust trend.
is superior to the linear regression model over all the ﬁve diﬀerent distributed data sets. Figure
3(b) reports the precision of the trust trend for both regression models. From the graph, the
exponential regression model brings with us more accurate trust trend compared with the
linear regression model over all the ﬁve diﬀerent distributed data sets. The precision of the
trust trend for the linear regression model sometimes is pretty low, for example, only 40% for
the exponential distributed data set. This is because sometimes the linear regression model
predicts the opposite trust trend, which makes the cosine value negative and hence dragging
down the average precision. Overall, the exponential regress model proposed in this paper
has more accurate precision in predicting both the trust value and trust trend compared with
the linear regression model.
Eﬀectiveness: Having verifying the precision of our technique, we proceed to test its eﬀec-
tiveness. In this set of experiments, we use the disclosure rate to measure the eﬀectiveness
of our proposed multi-level delegation model. We are going to use H , M and L to denote
the High, Medium and Low level in the classiﬁcation of delegation tasks or the trust level of
the delegatees, separately. Recall our trust-based delegation model, if a data requester is in
High trust level, then s/he can be assigned with H , M or L level tasks; if the data requester
is in Medium trust level, then s/he can be assigned with M or L level tasks; Otherwise, the
data requester can only be assigned with L level tasks. Suppose there are n data requesters,
among which there are nH data requesters are with High level of trust, nM requesters are with
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Disclosure rate comparison when varying (a) the number of H levels;
(b) the number of M levels; (c) the number of L levels.
Medium level of trust, and nL are with Low level of trust, where nH + nM + nL = n. In this
case, the requesters could totally access 3nH +2nM +nL delegation tasks, which indicates the
number of secure delegations. Consider the situation where there is no speciﬁcation of trust
levels, the data requester, whatever the trust value and trend s/he holds, could receive three
possible task assignments. Then it would be 3(nH + nM + nL) delegations, and among those,
there will be 3(nH + nM + nL)− (3nH +2nM + nL) insecure delegations. Thus, we deﬁne the
disclosure rate as 1 − 3nH+2nM+nL
3(nH+nM+nL)
. The lower the rate is, the more secure the delegation is.
We randomly generate n data requesters, and evaluate how the number of data requesters in
H , M or L levels aﬀect the disclosure rate. In order to reduce the randomness, we run the
each test for 500 times for each data and use the average to mark the graph.
The results are shown in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) displays the disclosure rate by varying
the portion of H from 10% to 90%. From the graph, we can see that the disclosure rate
is decreasing as the amount of H increases. This is expected, since the more the H level
requesters are, the less the insecure delegations are and the lower the disclosure rate is.
Figure 4(b) describes the disclosure rate by varying M from 10% to 90%. The graph shows
that the disclosure rate almost remains unchanged with the increased portion of M . Figure
4(c) reports the eﬀect of L on the disclosure rate. When varying the portion of L from 10% to
90%, the disclosure rate is ascending. It indicates that the more L level requesters are assigned
to delegation tasks, the higher chances for the sensitive information to be disclosed. However,
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our proposed delegation model could better avoid the sensitive information disclosure by
specifying requesters’ trust levels. Therefore, in this case, our proposed multi-level delegation
model is superior to the traditional delegation model.
5 Related work
Delegation has received considerable attention from the research community. In [3], Barka
and Sandhu proposed a framework for role-based delegation models (RBDM), which identiﬁes
a number of characteristics related to delegation. Example characteristics are monotonicity,
totality, and levels of delegation.
There exists a wealth of delegation models in literature [27, 28, 5]. Zhang et al. [27]
presented a role-based delegation model called RDM2000. Their model supports the speciﬁ-
cation of delegation authorization rules to impose restrictions on which roles can be delegated
to whom. Zhang et al. [28] proposed a role-based delegation model called PBDM, which
supports both role and permission level delegation. Their model controls delegation oper-
ations through the notion of delegatable roles such that only permissions assigned to these
roles can be delegated to others. In [5], Crampton and Khambhammettu proposed a dele-
gation model that supports both grant and transfer. Atluri and Warner [2] studied how to
support delegation in workﬂow systems. They extended the notion of delegation to allow
conditional delegation, where conditions can be determined on time, workload and task at-
tributes. One may specify rules to determine under what condition a delegation operation
should be performed.
All of the above work focus on the modeling and management of delegation, while our
paper focuses on developing a secure delegation model in access control systems. More im-
portantly, none of the above work discusses the trust relationship between delegators and
delegatees, but our delegation model is founded on trust. We also investigate the eﬀective-
ness of our proposed multi-level delegation model and the experimental results conﬁrm the
advantages of our model in privacy protection.
Trust evaluation is a recent approach for access control systems that enables resource
requesters and providers in open systems to establish trust. Bonatti and Samarati [4] proposed
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a framework based on a policy language and an interaction model for regulating access to
network services. Their trust establishment framework uses logical rules for accessing services
and avoiding the unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information. Winsborough and Li [23]
introduced the Trust Target Graph (TTG) protocol for conducting trust negotiation. A
particular emphasis of their work was protection against leaking sensitive information during
a trust negotiation. PeerTrust [17] is a trust management system that uses a simple and
expressive policy language based on distributed logic programs. PeerTrust agents perform
automated trust negotiation to obtain access to sensitive resources. However, these studies
are more focus on trust negotiation policies rather than build trust evaluation approaches. In
our paper, we organize trust into diﬀerent trust levels based on trust values and trust trend.
The trust value depicts the history trust, while trust trend depicts the future change of trust.
Moreover, we apply trust levels to delegation and develop a multi-level delegation model.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we propose a multi-level delegation model with trust management, where both
delegation tasks and trust are organized into three levels. The delegation task levels are
classiﬁed according to the information sensitivity, while, the trust levels combine trust values
and trust trend together to indicate to what extent a delegatee is reliable or trustworthy. Our
multi-level delegation model allows that a delegatee in a higher trust level can be assigned
with a higher level of task. In the experimental evaluations, we study the precision of our trust
model in predicting the trend of the trust and investigate the eﬀectiveness of our proposed
multi-level delegation model in terms of information disclosures.
This work motivates several directions for future research. First, since delegation opera-
tions could temporarily change the access control state so as to allow an agent to use another
agent’s access privileges, colluding users may abuse the delegation support of access control
systems to circumvent security policies, such as separation of duty. We are intend to consider
an enhanced form of delegation in order to avoid collusion in our future work. Second, we
did not discuss much on the revocation of delegation. It is interesting to develop a revocation
model to protect security under our multi-level delegation model.
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